As the international interactions increase, world leaders are able to turn to social problems that threaten the global population as a whole. The issue which has recently come to the forefront of transnational concerns is terrorism. The bombings of September 11, 2001 demonstrated the vulnerability of the United States to transnational threats. Until recently, Americans have had the fortune of being relatively insulated from terrorism- only 190 Americans died as a result of domestic terrorism in the eighties and nineties and only 666 died internationally. Consequently, terrorism had never seemed like a significant threat to American society as a whole.

However, the growing complexity and interdependent nature of our socio-economic structure has made the US increasingly vulnerable to an attack by a few people at a few strategic locations like the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The attacks of September 11^th shut down the metropolis of New York City, completely halted air travel for days, and sent the national economy reeling. Since then, people have been scrambling to find effective methods to prevent future damage from terrorist activities. The most visible action which is being executed is the "hunt" for Osama Bin Laden and other leaders of Al-Quaida, the alleged sponsor of the attacks. Billions in spending have been approved; the president has even gone so far as to create a new cabinet position- the director of homeland security- the new domestic counterpart to the director of the NSA. Some efforts have also been made to form a global political front against terrorism and to preempt terrorist activities both overseas and on US soil. These measures, however necessary, only address the end result of an immensely complex social problem, and may in fact exacerbate the root causes of terrorism. These stopgap measures must be accompanied by a careful analysis of the motivations for the support of terrorism and how US policy can be altered to reduce this motivation.

Whenever one begins to discuss terrorism and its motives, it becomes immediately apparent that a clear definition of terrorism is necessary. Oddly enough, this means that one must define the legal bounds of inflicting violence on civilians. Without a careful definition of terrorism, every revolutionary and every commander who has ordered strategic bombing could be branded a terrorist. Most generally, terrorism is defined as the premeditated use of violence against a non-combatant force by a subnational group with the immediate purpose of instilling widespread fear in order to effect political or social change. (Kushner 10, Pillar 13) This definition clearly distinguishes between those who attack non-combatants for a strategic or symbolic purpose (as in the fire bombing of Dresden or the Boston Tea Party, respectively), and those who use violence to induce fear in a broad populous for political purposes (as in the Japanese Red Army's sarin attack). Furthermore, no soldier under the flag of a sovereign nation is a terrorist. Consequently, there are few sovereign nations who support terrorist activities, since they tend to contribute to political instability.

This nearly universal aversion to terrorism can be best seen in the recent outpouring of support for the United States, even from nations who have traditionally antagonized the United States and international policies. The United States' counter terrorism policies have achieved remarkable domestic and international support, especially considering the aggressive, militaristic nature of the response. However, the response also follows typical United States policy from the seventies and eighties, even though many analysts have noted that the organization and motivation of terrorists have morphed dramatically in the past decade. In the seventies and eighties, terrorist organizations had hierarchical leadership structure, with clearly defined objectives and grievances.

To combat these terrorists, the United States had developed a set of guidelines which we have followed, for the most part, when dealing with terrorism. These guidelines were primarily directed at disrupting the structure of organizations and depriving the groups of the slightest positive result from their violence. The traditional four tenets of the United States' policy toward terrorism are as follow: we do not give concessions to terrorists; we work to bring terrorists to justice; we isolate and apply pressure on states which sponsor or harbor terrorists; and we bolster the counter-terrorism capabilities any and all nations which cooperate with our goals (Pillar 8). (Notably, the Iran-Contra scandal is an event during which the US deviated from its traditional terrorist policy of non-negotiation.) Recently, to these ends, the government has sought to increase interdepartmental cooperation, redefine international antiterrorism laws, and standardize international fiscal laws, as well as improve tactical options for "bringing terrorists to justice" (Bowman 30).

These principles have worked somewhat successfully in the 1980s and 1990s against organized groups with clear ideologies such as radical leftists and ethno-nationalists. Attacks on their structure and operations coupled with the denial of concessions managed to curb terrorist violence to a reasonable level. Unfortunately, a new generation of terrorists has emerged with amorphous organization and blurred objectives(Hoffman 86). The structural organization of the contemporary terrorist group is vaporous and the leadership difficult to target- the members draw their cohesion and vision simply from their common hatred for America and the Western world. This makes addressing their grievances extremely frustrating. As State Department counterterrorism coordinator Paul L. Bremer notes,

This quote captures the essence of the hopelessness that plagues efforts to find a long term solution to modern terrorism. Even the eradication of entire terrorist factions may provoke greater antagonisms against the United States and fuel future motivations toward violence. This is especially likely to occur in regions like Afghanistan where there exist social groups which extol the merits of martyrs and where there is widespread suffering that can somehow be linked to United States policy or Western influence. This leaves us in quite a predicament: we surely cannot stand by while terrorists continue to inflict violence on US soil; but for every enemy we rout, we risk aiding the recruitment of a dozen more enemies to follow in their martyr's footsteps. Can there be a solution? Or must we simply strive to make it difficult for terrorists to accomplish their goals and make an attempt to eliminate them as fast as they are recruited.

I believe that the most outstanding flaw in the American policy toward terrorism is the mentality that "terrorism is a challenge to be managed, not solved" (Pillar vii). A great deal of effort and resources are invested in tracking down terrorists and hindering their ability to cause harm. However, surprisingly little attention has paid to the source of their grievances.

Attacks against the United States and its interests accounted for over a third of global terrorist attacks in the 1990's (Pillar 57). There is some underlying grievance that most of these people bear against the United States, and I firmly believe that can be traced, in some way, to irresponsible political and economic policies. While it is true that there are a number of "incorrigible" terrorists like Usamah Bin Laden who have risen as the leaders of violent groups, the ranks of these organizations are certainly not filled by people born as zealous as their leaders. Consequently, there are ways to deal with the root causes of their terrorism. Without followers, terrorists like bin Laden are reduced to severely disgruntled minority which poses no lasting threat to global order.

Tragically, I believe that our violent reaction to the events of September 11 may very well bolster support for terrorist groups overseas by increasing the suffering of innocent civilian populations. There are very real causes behind the support of terrorist groups. If it weren't for the suffering caused by US policies, it would be impossible for clerics like Shiek Rahman to persuade Islamic youths to become martyrs. The words of Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, hint at the logic in the use of terrorism: